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ABSTRACT: This article compares salary levels and additional factors 
to the salary that is paid in some Latin American countries and their 
relationship with national competitiveness policies. Based on the 
available data and the author’s judgment, cases of development of 
deregulation policies of labor laws in force in Colombia are analyzed, 
as a strategy drawn up by the national government to improve the 
country’s competitive position. By contrasting variables such as 
minimum wage, multidimensional poverty index, Gini inequality index 
and competitiveness index in Latin American countries, with similar 
indicators from advanced countries in Europe such as Sweden and 
Germany, and the analysis of their system with regard to the legal 
wage, it is concluded that there is no apparent correlation between 
the decrease in the wages of the working class and the increase in 
the country’s competitiveness.
Keywords: minimum wage - benefit factors – competitiveness - Labor 
legislation.
RESUMEN: En este artículo se comparan los niveles salariales y los 
factores adicionales al salario que son pagados en algunos países 
de América Latina y su relación con las políticas de competitividad 
nacional. A partir de los datos disponibles y el propio juicio del autor, 
se analizan casos de desarrollo de políticas de desregulación de las 
leyes laborales vigentes en Colombia, como una estrategia trazada por 
el gobierno nacional para mejorar la posición competitiva del país. 
Mediante el contraste de datos de variables como salario mínimo, índice 
de pobreza multidimensional, índice de desigualdad de Gini e índice de 
competitividad en países de América latina, con indicadores similares 
de países avanzados de Europa como Suecia y Alemania, y el análisis 
de su sistema legal salarial, se llega a la conclusión de que no existe 
correlación evidente entre la disminución de los salarios de la clase 
trabajadora y el aumento de la competitividad del país.
Palabras clave: salario mínimo - factores prestacionales – 
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INTRODUCTION
Salary has been the focus of the discussion in labor-
management relations, even before unionism was 
recognized as an activity protected by law, after an 
arduous political and social process dating back to 
1900 (Zorrilla, 1988). It has also been the center 
of the discussion of public policies of competitive-
ness in countries around the world. Besides, two 
significant issues generate conflict between the 
union sector, the business associations, and the 
government: the fixing of the so-called “minimum 
wage” and the regulation of factors additional to 
the price of labor.
Based on the legacy of Adam Smith, the construction 
of classical economic theory and nineteenth-century 
worker-employer relations was based on the emplo-
yment-wage-birth relationship: employers found a 
convenient combination of these variables (Altimir, 
1979) as exit to “the relationship between the ‘fault 
of the working class’ and the increasing misery ob-
served” (Aktouf, 2009, p.56). The idea of  paying a 
“sufficient” salary that diminished the demographic 
explosion of the working class, limiting the number 
of children a worker could maintain with his salary 
while avoiding his “eccentric behaviors”: drinking, 
debauchery, and promiscuity arose. , which resulted 
in the procreation of more poor people (Aktouf, 
2006). The “altruistic” solution was called “salary 
necessary for the reproduction of the working mas-
ses” or minimum living wage, in countries not yet 
deregulated labor (Aktouf, 2006). Hence, a classic 
concept of management was derived: it is useless to 
pay higher salaries to try to obtain a better perfor-
mance of the employees because granting material 
incentives to the worker would produce a fast curve 
of diminishing performance returns (Aktouf, 2006).
In America, throughout the twentieth century, union 
struggles to obtain better working conditions and 
guarantees -not exempt from vices of bureaucrati-
zation, ideologization, and politicization (Zorrilla, 
1988) - promoted the development of various labor 
laws in each country. The regulation of work granted 
association rights, fixed hours, remuneration of extra 
work, recognition of breaks and paid vacations, after 
tortuous worker-employer-government negotiation 
processes. These labor rights are privileges granted 
discretionally by the States to their citizens, through 
their respective legal systems (Archila, 2011).
The discussion presented here focuses on (i) whether 
there is a correlation between the minimum wage 
level and national competitiveness and (ii) if there 
is a correlation between the deregulation of extra 
factors to salary and the level of foreign investment, 
the decrease in unemployment and the increase in 
competitiveness.
METHODOLOGY
Variables used: it was analyzed the variable national 
competitiveness and its relationship with indepen-
dent variables such as minimum wage and level of 
additional factors to salary cost. Unit of analysis: it 
was analyzed the specific case of the public policy 
of wage deregulation traced by the government of 
Colombia in the last ten years. Method: the data 
on competitiveness variables at the Latin American 
level, measured with the Global Competitiveness 
Index (GCI) and the amount of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI), were compared with the minimum 
wage and benefit factor levels of the salary in this 
group of countries. The competitiveness data of the 
Colombian case were contrasted with the evolution 
of the country’s poverty and inequality indexes in 
the global context. In turn, these data were con-
trasted with the same indicators in economically 
and socially advanced countries in Europe. Scope 
and limitations: conclusions were raised in general 
and for the Colombian case on the relationship 
between salaries and competitiveness, as a result 
of the critical analysis of this information.
RESULTS
Poverty, Minimum Wage and 
Competitiveness in Colombia
The current conditions of the Colombian working 
class are similar to those of the English workers 
of the early twentieth century: an uneducated 
workforce, with a marked tendency to waste wages 
in alcohol and other vices (Archila, 2011), ge-
nerates a vicious spiral of poverty (Balza-Franco, 
2013). According to the National Administrative 
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Department of Statistics (DANE by its acronym in 
Spanish), in 2018 Colombia has about 50 million 
inhabitants, of which 8 % are in extreme poverty.
A determining factor of the poverty threshold is the 
low purchasing power offered by the wage earned by 
the working class, which generates greater poverty 
and inequality. However, the neoliberal doctrine that 
has guided the Colombian economic policy of the 
last 30 years preaches that wages should not increa-
se above inflation. Even high-ranking government 
officials call the current minimum wage in Colombia 
“ridiculously high.” The dreaded consequence of a 
more significant increase in the minimum wage is 
the increase in the unemployment rate, the great 
global concern in the last decade.
A report prepared by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) for the United Nations (UN) 
warns that:
Labor and social prospects in the world indicate 
that the number of unemployed will increase again 
this year and will go from 197 million in 2015 to 
199 million in 2016. [...] It also foresees another 
increase in 2017 and estimates that 1.1 million 
people they will be added that year to the ranks 
of those who do not have a job (UN, 2016, p.1).
More than 200 million unemployed in the world 
justifies the genuine interest of governments to 
combat unemployment and inflation, economic 
variables that can ruin a country. However, these 
variables are also used as arguments to manipulate 
the social pressure towards the progressive reduction 
of real wages, by inducing a sophism: the high cost 
of salary drives away investment and the generation 
of employment. This generates an economic dilem-
ma: to reduce the cost of the salary factor to try to 
attract foreign investment (fleeting perhaps) and 
increase competitiveness while reducing the pur-
chasing power of the population and discouraging 
the economy.
The dominant theory of national competitiveness de-
rives from the model of “the competitive advantage 
of nations” by Porter (1991); from here, the most 
accepted theoretical models of measurement emerge 
(Benzaque, Del Carpio, Zegarra and Valdivia, 2010). 
According to these models, national competitiveness 
is related, among other factors, to the ability to 
increase the living standards of the inhabitants and 
to insert themselves in international markets. One 
of the indicators of national competitiveness that 
emerges here is the Global Competitiveness Index 
(IGC), which measures “the ability of a nation to 
achieve sustained economic growth in the long 
term concerning the resources available” (National 
System of Competitiveness, Science, Technology, 
and Innovation, 2017). Table 1 shows data on the 
IGC score, position in the world ranking and the 
minimum wage of the countries of Latin America 
(LA) in 2017.
Table 1.
Minimum wage and IGC index in Latin America (Year 2017)
COUNTRY MINIMUM WAGE IN DOLLARS 
SCORE
IGC
GLOBAL POSITION 
ACCORDING TO IGC
Panama $ 744 4.4 50
Argentina $ 544 4.0 92
Costa Rica $ 512 4.5 47
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COUNTRY MINIMUM WAGE IN DOLLARS 
SCORE
IGC
GLOBAL POSITION 
ACCORDING TO IGC
Chile $ 456 4.7 33
Uruguay $431 4.1 76
Ecuador $391 3.9 97
Guatemala $380 4.1 84
Honduras $341 3.9 96
Paraguay $340 3.7 112
Brazil $325 4.1 80
Colombia $295 4.3 66
Dominican Republic $288 3.9 104
Bolivia $262 N.D N.D
Peru $255 4.2 72
El Salvador $251 3.8 109
Mexico $139 4.4 51
Nicaragua $115 3.9 93
Source: own elaboration based on data from the World Economic Forum. (World Economic Forum, 2018), and the web (Financial Network 
Mexico, 2017).
Judging from the available data, the inverse rela-
tionship that arises between competitiveness and 
wages is sophistic. The highest minimum wage in LA 
is paid in Argentina and the lowest in Nicaragua. In 
turn, Chile (4th highest minimum wage) leads the 
group of most competitive countries in the region 
according to the IGC index, while Paraguay shows the 
worst performance. Panama pays the highest salary 
in the region and occupies the third position in com-
petitiveness in this group of countries. Under the 
premise that at a lower price of the salary factor, the 
higher the level of competitiveness, Nicaragua would 
be the most competitive country in Latin America. 
The data do not allow establishing statistically 
significant parameters, but there is no correlation 
between low salaries and high competitiveness.
Labor Rights, Salary Benefit Factors, and 
Foreign Direct Investment
The dominant neoliberal economic policy in Latin 
America perceives the labor rights associated 
with the compensation of extra or night work as 
a competitive disadvantage to draw the desired 
foreign investment; This conditions the generation 
of jobs at ever lower wage rates. By deregulating 
these surcharges, we seek to make the business 
environment “more competitive” and attractive.
A case that illustrates this strategy in Colombia 
dates from the 2002-2010 government. The exe-
cutive, through the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
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designed labor deregulation strategies to “sell” 
the country as an investment destination:
Proexport presented the [...] results of the study 
and stated that, according to the balance sheets 
obtained, ‘Colombia has a highly competitive 
labor regime from the employer and is well posi-
tioned concerning the region. (...) The analyzes 
indicate that ‘the range of hours of the daytime 
working day, contemplated in the Colombian 
legislation is the third most extensive - together 
with Peru - being only surpassed by the Chilean 
and Brazilian.’ The country also has the broadest 
range of hours of the working day, sharing the 
first place with Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and 
Argentina (Colombian Federation of Human 
Resources - ACRIP, 2009, p.1).
The strategy materialized by reducing the time 
slot legally considered “extra night work”: in this 
period, the Colombian government carried out a 
“re-engineering” of the labor regime in force until 
then, attacking the distinction between day and 
night work, in order to reduce the surcharge for 
night work (35 %), which was recognized after 
six in the evening, establishing that the night 
work began at ten o’clock at night. This change in 
legislation favored the interests of transnational 
corporations in large stores: the new standard 
allowed for extending the service hours to cus-
tomers until 11 o’clock at night, without having 
to pay nightly surcharges. The “competitive” 
strategy of the Colombian government was to 
turn night into day, for the same salary. It was 
argued that this would generate more jobs, but, 
in fact, the effect was to reduce the wage cost 
of night work to large companies, affecting the 
primary income of families.
The single extension of the day shift saved annual 
nightly surcharges for 1440 person-hours for em-
ployers, to the detriment of workers. Using the 
current minimum wage in Colombia as a referen-
ce, this amounts to $COP 1 642 200 worker/year. 
The 2.2 million night workers stopped receiving 
the not insignificant sum of 3.6 billion COP - 
some 1.2 billion dollars - that were capitalized 
by private companies.
The workers who saw their income reduced were 
those of the formal sector, regulated by labor 
legislation, and mainly those of commerce, sur-
veillance, hotels, bars and restaurants, transport, 
hospitals, and the industrial sector. Some 2.2 
million people who work after six in the after-
noon, and 1.9 million who do it on Sundays and 
holidays, suffered a reduction of their monthly 
salary by 17.2 %, only by the suppression of 35 
% of the night surcharge between six and ten at 
night; and in 5.8 % due to the 25 % decrease in 
the payment on Sunday and holidays (Vasquez, 
2016, p.1).
The measure was partially revised during the 
2014-2018 legislation, overcoming multiple po-
litical obstacles; finally, it was approved to pay 
a night surcharge from nine o’clock at night. In 
the large-scale, labor-intensive trade, labor cost 
savings were significant.
On the other hand, salary factors, such as bo-
nuses and vacations, constituted an essential 
weight of the total labor cost to the employer in 
LA. Certain benefits enshrined in Colombian or 
Argentine law are unknown in other countries of 
the continent. For example, the “salary bonus” in 
Colombia -payment of an additional month of sa-
lary to the workers, equivalent to the “aguinaldo” 
in Argentine legislation (Wageindicator, 2018), is 
a concept unknown in the United States.
In the same way, in Argentina, the benefit factor 
is equivalent to more than 35 % in addition to 
the nominal salary (Urien, 2017). Table 2 sum-
marizes these salary factors (not including payroll 
taxes) in some Latin American countries and the 
amounts received from foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in millions of dollars in 2016 (Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
CEPAL by its acronym in Spanish 2017).
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Table 2.
Additional salary factors to the payroll (2017)
COUNTRY %
IED 
(MILLONS USD)
% DIFFERENCE IN FDI 
2016-2015
Argentina 35.3 4 229 -64 %
Bolivia 32.2 410 -26 %
Brazil 30.5 78 929 5.7 %
Chile 30.2 12 225 -40.3 %
Colombia 29.0 13 593 15.9 %
Ecuador 22.6 744 -43.7 %
Mexico 19.2 32 113 -7.9 %
Paraguay 17.4 260 5.1 %
Peru 16.6 6 863 -17 %
Uruguay 11.0 953 -25.5 %
Source: own elaboration based on (Urien, 2017) and data of (CEPAL, 2017).
The reduction of FDI in Latin America was general 
in the 2015-2016 period; however, there is no evi-
dence of a correlation between the percentage of 
the additional benefit factor to the salary and the 
amount of the investment or the increase/reduction 
in said investment.
Despite having the highest wage costs in the con-
tinent, Argentina has experienced policies of strong 
wage deregulation:
Thus, throughout the nineties, the rules on salary de-
termination were established (salary indexation was 
eliminated, collective bargaining was decentralized, 
and wage variations were linked to the evolution 
of productivity). The right to strike is limited; the 
vacation regime is altered; the accident prevention 
system is privatized; various forms of temporary 
contracts that reduce the cost for employers are put 
into effect (Ibagón, 2014, p.5).
However, this deregulation has not led to an increase 
in FDI, as evidenced in Table 2. In contrast, Uruguay, 
which has the lowest cost of salary surcharge, also 
presented a reduction in FDI. It is evident that there 
is no inverse correlation between these factors.
The Salary Factors of the Colombian Wage
In the Colombian case, the “compensations” factors 
include surcharges to the payroll for social security 
and social benefits, plus the so-called “parafiscal 
contributions” - payroll taxes destined to finan-
ce state entities such as the National Service of 
Learning (SENA) and the Colombian Family Welfare 
Institute (ICBF by its acronym in Spanish) -. This 
set of surcharges equals an additional 53 % of the 
nominal salary paid by the employer. These factors 
strongly impact the cost structure of labor-intensive 
firms, such as commerce and industry. However, the 
impact is more significant in small entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurs, hindering the sustainability of 
new companies and stimulating labor informality.
Tax strategies to encourage job creation, aimed at 
reducing labor costs, have been misguided. The tax 
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reform (Law 1607) of 2012 exonerated Colombian 
companies from the payment of parafiscal, to create 
more jobs and to achieve a better distribution of 
income; but the real effect was to transfer the labor 
cost to taxpayers: “In practice [...] companies stop 
paying 13.5 % of parafiscal contributions that end 
up being charged in large part to natural persons for 
whom the tax burden increases directly “(Farné and 
Rodríguez, 2013, p.127). Large companies capitalize 
or drain the savings generated by this concept via 
profits, without being translated into new jobs.
DISCUSSION
The Labor Deregulation Strategy and its 
Effect on National Competitiveness
The “recipes” of the International Monetary Fund, 
guided by neoliberal policies, advise dismantling 
the social benefits recognized by law, pointing 
them out as “competitive disadvantage”, which, if 
corrected -placing the salary-, would generate more 
employment (Aktouf, 2009); that is, more people 
working, but with less income. This theory seems 
logical, but nothing guarantees that the surpluses 
of operating profit generated by reducing the wage 
factor will be translated into new jobs, as was ob-
served in Colombia with the exoneration of parafiscal 
payments to large companies. A sophism is thus 
configured: the level of employment is a function 
inversely proportional to the cost of salary. However, 
the Keynesian current of economic thought suggests 
that a better redistribution of income generates 
economic growth, and therefore a higher level of 
employment. Keynes proposed “redistributing part 
of the income of the rich among the poor because 
an increase in consumption increased production 
and boosted economic growth” (Delgado, 2014, 
p.366). That is to say, the higher incomes of the 
population - better wages - would generate greater 
demand for goods and services, achieving higher 
sales and profits for all companies; this premise is 
the basis of the European “Welfare State” model, as 
criticized by Keynes himself as by the neo-liberal 
economists.
In contrast, the Colombian neoliberal government 
supports its competitiveness model in a policy of 
precariousness of work and progressive pauperiza-
tion of the working class, achieving at the same time 
meager results of competitiveness at international 
scales: Colombia ranks 66th out of 133 economies 
in the world. The ranking published by the World 
Economic Forum -FEM-; in contrast, it ranks 37th 
out of 183 countries on the Doing business scale-
promoted by the World Bank- (Vasquez, 2011). This 
scale classifies countries that offer a better envi-
ronment for doing business and hiring staff, given 
factors such as the favorable nature of the salary and 
hiring regime: “Colombia is now considered to be 
‘the most competitive country in the labor regime’, 
after labor reforms made outside the social dialogue 
and against the opinion of the unions “(Vasquez, 
2011, p.42)
In addition to the extension of the working day, such 
reforms include the flexibility of the hiring regime, 
another potent threat to job stability. The consulting 
firm Ernst & Young, in partnership with Proexport, 
published a study on labor competitiveness, com-
paring the labor laws of Colombia, Mexico, Chile, 
Argentina, Peru, Brazil, and Costa Rica; Colombia 
stood out as the most competitive in the region, 
considering various labor variables. The study men-
tioned above was carried out in order to:
... determine the aspects of the regulations that 
are most attractive for an investor at the time of 
establishing their business in each of the previous 
countries’, and included the analysis of the hiring, 
salary and social benefits schemes, the working 
day and that of compensation and collective rights 
(Vasquez, 2011, p.42).
The strategy of promoting the country as an inves-
tment destination, tied to a submissive wage policy 
with significant capital, undermines the rights of 
workers and the quality of life of the population. 
However, a correlation between wage reduction 
and increased competitiveness is not evident, as 
suggested by using biased indexes such as Doing 
Business. This indicator, subjective of the business 
climate, is leveraged in legal re-engineering and is 
opposed to more complete indicators such as the 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) of the World 
Economic Forum:
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The competitiveness index of the World Economic 
Forum is not based on strategies to reduce labor 
costs and the precariousness of hiring workers and 
their working conditions. They are built on the effi-
ciency of institutions, the quality, and efficiency of 
infrastructure; the soundness of the macroeconomic 
context; the size of the domestic market; health 
and primary education; the extension and quality 
of higher education; the efficiency of the markets; 
the sophistication of the financial and business mar-
kets; the technological availability and innovation 
(Vasquez, 2011, page 48).
The Cost of the Strategy: the Effect of Wage 
Reforms on Social Inequality
The GCI shares some variables with the Human 
Development Index -HDI- as a level of schooling and 
years of schooling. Strategies designed to strengthen 
these factors have a lasting impact on a country’s 
competitiveness -in particular investment in educa-
tion, as South Korea and Japan have shown-, having 
an impact on the improvement of living conditions. 
The deregulation of the wage and benefit system 
has marginal and temporary effects, without taking 
into account the high human and social cost. These 
reforms have generated one of the unequal socie-
ties in the world. According to the Gini Inequality 
Coefficient, by 2010 (World Bank, 2018) Colombia 
ranked first in world inequality - table 3, with very 
high levels of poverty (50 % of the population 
below the poverty line and 17 % in indigence), 
supported by a working population whose average 
income only covers 56 % of the poverty line (News 
Center - ONU, 2017).
Table 3.
Gini Inequality Coefficient
COUNTRY YEAR 2010 YEAR 2015
Colombia 55.6 51.5
Zambia 55.6 57.1
Honduras 53.4 50.1
Panamá 51.9 51
Paraguay 51.8 48
Ecuador 49.3 46.5
Peru 46.2 44.3
Source: own elaboration based on data from the World Bank (World Bank, 2018).
While Multidimensional Poverty in Colombia de-
creased from 30.4 % to 17.8 % between 2010 and 
2016 (DANE, 2017), the country showed poor results 
in the effort to reduce social inequality. Between 
2014 and 2016 the national Gini coefficient was 
reduced from 52.2 to 51.7 (DANE, 2017), equaling 
social inequality in Swaziland, one of the poorest 
countries in Africa.
It is a serious global problem: the current eco-
nomy has generated massive inequalities; some 
people are now as rich as entire countries (Piketty, 
2014). Social inequality cannot be dismissed as a 
pro-socialist ideological discourse, it is a concrete 
and real problem that threatens to become a time 
bomb for the global society: “Can we imagine a 21st 
century in which capitalism will transcend towards 
a way more peaceful and more lasting, or should it 
simply wait for the next crisis or the next war - this 
time truly global -? “(Piketty, 2014, p.330). Pikketty, 
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Aktouf, and other influential scholars have been 
emphatic in pointing out that a new way of making 
capitalism is required.
The Third Way: Unconventional Economic, 
Salary and Fiscal Models
In contrast, the leading countries of the WEF com-
petitiveness index are precisely those that, adopting 
models of industrial capitalism, show better income 
distribution, greater institutionality, lower corruption 
indexes, and better public governance. Given the 
previous discussion about the inverse relationship 
between minimum wage and competitiveness, it is 
appropriate to observe that the data of countries with 
economic models of a social-democratic nature and 
with a strong union tradition such as Germany and 
Sweden (Aktouf, 2009) show precisely the opposite. In 
fact, regarding wage policy, there is no formal minimum 
wage in these countries. The high rate of unionization 
and coverage of collective bargaining - more than 87 
% of the employed population in Sweden versus 2 % 
in Colombia - make it unnecessary (Vasquez, 2011). In 
Sweden, there is a compulsory agreement with trade 
unions in an annual national salary conference between 
employees and employers (Aktouf, 2009). However, 
unemployment levels in Germany and Sweden are the 
lowest in Europe (table 4), their economies are the 
strongest in the Eurozone and their inflation rates 
remain low, keeping interest rates stable: the bank 
German central bank kept the active interest rate below 
3 % per annum in the last 6 years (Tradingeconomics, 
2018). Recently, the German government issued public 
debt with negative interest rates (Expansión, 2015).
The successful management models of Swedish and 
German companies (IKEA, Volvo, Saab, Ericsson, 
BMW, Volkswagen, Siemens, SAP, Allianz, etc.) and the 
high level of Swedish technological entrepreneurship 
(Spotify, LinkedIn, and Skype) are a reflection of 
their respective economic models. The same happens 
with legendary Japanese management models based 
on quality. However, Japanese-style management, 
German-style or Scandinavian style have no similar uni-
versal acceptance than American-style management, 
being considered “particularities” by the dominant 
Anglo-Saxon literature with the “impossibility of being 
transferred to other stages of the world” (Garcia, 2011, 
p 158).
From the fiscal point of view, in Sweden, the inco-
me tax is progressive on income and paid without 
exception by workers and employers. In contrast, 
the neoliberal governments do not cease in their 
efforts to exonerate from paying taxes to the ri-
chest - in Colombia the income tax will be reduced 
to companies from 33 % to 28 %, while it will be 
increased to natural persons. The Swedish State is 
highly taxed on income-average of 38 % - which does 
not prevent the prosperity of free enterprise; on the 
contrary, it generates more significant benefits for all 
citizens, whether they are entrepreneurs or workers. 
Both Sweden and Germany are intensely capitalist 
economies, but not of the financial capitalism type 
-language in the profitability of the banking sectors, 
but of industrial and technological capitalism. In 
Colombia, 6 of the ten first companies in the country 
are banks and only one is industrial.
Table 4.
Economies of Sweden and Germany (2017)
INDICATOR SWEDEN GERMANY
GDP per capita (USD) € 47,000 € 39,500
Unemployment (%) 6.4 3.6
Minimum monthly wage (€) € 2 081 € 1 498
Global Competitiveness Index 5.52 5.65
Gini coefficient 0.25 0.28
Source: own elaboration based on data from the web (Expansión, 2018) and the FEM (World Economic Forum, 2018)
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CONCLUSION
The data analyzed show that the premise is that the 
higher wages of the population, higher unemploy-
ment, higher inflation, lower foreign investment and 
lower competitiveness of the country; the German-
Scandinavian example demolishes this economic 
myth. Despite the unfairness of the comparison bet-
ween European countries and Colombia - 1000 years 
of historical, cultural, economic and social develo-
pment separate us - the German and Scandinavian 
economies distribute wealth better and promote a 
more concerted worker-employer relationship and of 
mutual respect. Industrial capitalism in Germany and 
Scandinavia shows that a better wage level of the 
population drives the economy, increases the level 
of formal employment and reduces social inequality.
The public policy of national competitiveness based 
on the pauperization of the wage of the working 
class is wrong; It relates perception of ease of doing 
business with cheap labor rates. This only increases 
the social inequality gap, as evidenced by the Gini 
coefficient. Improving other indicators such as the 
GCI or the HDI can increase competitiveness.
Given this evidence, it is worthwhile to explore tradi-
tional ways-State policies, not government ones - to 
guide the country’s competitiveness, wage policy 
and the government-business-society relationship in 
a concerted effort to defeat poverty, inequality, and 
unemployment as the main obstacles to the progress 
and prosperity of the nation. Strategies aimed at 
reducing the cost of salary -e. g. via parafiscal tax 
reduction - to generate new employment should 
focus on SMEs or new ventures, without allowing 
large companies to access these tax benefits without 
real compensation in new jobs.
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